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Hannah Arendt Meets QAnon:
Conspiracy, Ideology, and the Collapse of Common Sense
David Luban
A whole literature on mass behavior and mass psychology …
[failed to predict] the general contempt for even the most obvious
rules of common sense.1
Totalitarian propaganda can outrageously insult common sense
only where common sense has lost its validity.2

§1. Outrages Against Common Sense
A June 2020 survey found one in four Americans agreeing that
“powerful people intentionally planned the coronavirus outbreak.”3 An
eighth of Americans younger than 30 thought the culprit is Bill Gates,
plotting to create a new world order by implanting mind-control microchips
in millions of vaccine recipients.4 This theory is revisionism of a kind: a
decade earlier, the mastermind seeking world domination was not Bill Gates
but George Soros, at least according to a fifth of Americans surveyed in
2011. The 2011 survey also found that about one in five respondents were
“truthers” convinced that the 9/11 attacks were an inside job; and a quarter
were Obama “birthers.” Trutherism, birtherism, and Soros domination plots
were three of seven popular conspiracy theories studied, and it turns out that
roughly half the respondents believed at least one of them.5 In fall 2020,
1

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 3rd ed. (New York: Harvest Books, 1994)
[henceforth OT], 316.
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OT, 352.
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Katherine Schaeffer, “A look at the Americans who believe there is some truth to the
conspiracy theory that COVID-19 was planned,” Pew Research Center FactTank, July 24,
2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/24/a-look-at-the-americans-whobelieve-there-is-some-truth-to-the-conspiracy-theory-that-covid-19-was-planned/.
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Rainer Zitelman, “How Many Americans Believe in Conspiracy Theories?”, Forbes, June
29,
2020,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rainerzitelmann/2020/06/29/how-manyamericans-believe-in-conspiracy-theories/#3e2fd9855e94.
5
J. Eric Oliver & Thomas J. Wood, “Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style(s) of
Mass Opinion,” American Journal of Political Science 58(4): 956 (Table 1)(2014); 958
(half of Americans believe at least one of seven theories). The other theories, and their
level of support are: the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was not a response to terrorism, but
was driven by oil companies and Jews (19%); the financial crisis of 2008 was engineered
by Wall Street bankers to extend the power of the Federal Reserve and further their control
of the world’s economy (25%); lingering aircraft vapor trails are chemical agents being
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seven percent in a survey of registered American voters said they believe
the elaborate and grotesque mythology of QAnon, which pits Donald
Trump against a gang of child-trafficking, Satan-worshipping, blooddrinking leftist elites. Another eleven percent were unsure whether they
believe it.6 The satanic gang is protected by the Deep State and financed by
the ubiquitous Soros. In summer 2020, German QAnon enthusiasts
interpreted NATO military exercises as a happy sign that Trump, their
superhero savior, would soon invade Germany and free it from Angela
Merkel.7 November and December 2020 found tens of millions of
Americans believing in election-theft plots that would require superhuman
levels of coordination and secrecy among dozens, perhaps hundreds, of
otherwise-unconnected and unidentified miscreants, with hundreds more
covering it up or looking away.
Whatever happened to common sense?
Quassim Cassam observes that “anti-Semitism is the original sin of
Conspiracy Theories,” and it comes as no surprise that antisemitism, that
sturdy stalwart, continues to defy common sense today.8 It defies common
sense when a “progressive” Washington, D.C. city council member posted
a video blaming a snow storm on weather manipulation by the Rothschilds.9
It defies common sense when Europeans wildly overestimate the Jewish
populations of their own countries even though most say they are unaware
of ever having met a Jew.10 Holocaust agnosticism and ignorance are

spread by the government for nefarious purposes (9%); and the mandated switch to
compact fluorescent lightbulbs is a government mind-control plot (11%). The percentages
here are the sum of those who answered “agree” and those who answered “strongly agree.”
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Civiqs, “QAnon Support: Registered Voters,” Sept. 10, 2020–Oct. 11, 2020,
https://civiqs.com/results/qanon_support?uncertainty=true&annotations=true&zoomIn=tr
ue. Some researchers doubt that QAnon has anything like this kind of support. Adam M.
Enders & Joseph E. Uscinski, “Is QAnon taking over America? Not so fast,” The Guardian,
August 18, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/18/qanonamerica-conspiracy-theory. Possibly QAnon followers are highly motivated by politics, so
that they are overrepresented among the registered voters Civiqs surveyed.
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https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/11/world/europe/qanon-is-thriving-in-germany-theextreme-right-is-delighted.html.
8
Quassim Cassam, Conspiracy Theories (Polity Press, 2019), 123.
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Peter Jamison & Valerie Strauss, “D.C. lawmaker says recent snowfall caused by
‘Rothschilds controlling the climate’,” Washington Post, March 18, 2018. This particular
opinion seems to originate with an internet conspiracy theorist who also maintains that
wireless electric meters are part of a “diabolical” plot of global domination. Googling her
name produced more than seven million results.
10
CNN polled in Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, and Great Britain.
A quarter of Hungarians, and one out of five Poles and British, believe that the world is
more than 20% Jewish, a number off by a factor of 100. “Four out of ten respondents in
the survey thought their own countries were between 3% and 10% Jewish,” where in fact
no country other than Israel is more than 2% Jewish. Richard Allen Green, “CNN poll
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worldwide, and sadly come as no surprise. Given the passage of time, and
abysmal ignorance of history across all topics, these are not necessarily
departures from common sense.11 What defies common sense is that eleven
percent of young Americans believe that the Jews caused the Holocaust.12
None of this would have surprised Hannah Arendt. The loss of
common sense is one of the main themes of The Origins of Totalitarianism,
where the phrase appears more than forty times; the very first page warns
that “never have we depended so much on political forces that cannot be
trusted to follow the rules of common sense.”13 In her later writings on
moral judgment, Arendt returns repeatedly to questions about common
sense and its collapse.
The questions are central to an inquiry into moral judgment. The
connection between common sense and good judgment may seem obvious;
indeed, some dictionaries define common sense as a species of good
judgment (“sound and prudent judgment based on a simple perception of
the situation or facts”; “sound practical judgment that is independent of
specialized knowledge, training, or the like.”14) However, we must not read
these definitions to be saying that common sense judgment is, by definition,
correct judgment. It needn’t be. This is obvious in science and medicine,
where common sense frequently turns out to be wrong; but it’s also obvious
in every human endeavor where judgment must be honed by training and
experience to produce reliable results. Common sense by itself is no
guarantor of truth or reliability.
Even apart from fields where judgment needs to be trained, we
sometimes find ourselves confronted by hard choices in everyday life, in
which two people of equal common sense might choose differently; that’s
what makes these choices hard. And we rightly recognize that some people
are better at tough choices than others.
In sum, common sense doesn’t guarantee good judgment. What
nevertheless seems indisputable is that coming unhinged from common
sense guarantees bad judgment. That is, although common sense isn’t a

reveals
depth
of
anti-Semitism
in
Europe,”
CNN,
Nov.
2018,
https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2018/11/europe/antisemitism-poll-2018-intl/.
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After all, a third of surveyed Americans don’t know in which century the American
Revolution took place, and half believe it came after the Civil War, War of 1812, or the
Emancipation Proclamation. Allen C. Brownfield, “The danger ignorance of history poses
to a free society,” American Council of Trustees and Alumni, April 22, 2018,
https://www.goacta.org/news-item/the-danger-ignorance-of-history-poses-to-the-futureof-a-free-society/.
12
“Nearly two-thirds of US young adults unaware 6m Jews killed in the Holocaust,” The
Guardian, Sept. 16, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/16/holocaust-usadults-study. These numbers are not out of line with other countries.
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14
Merriam-Webster Dictionary on-line; Dictionary.com.

4
sufficient condition for sound judgment, it is a minimum necessary
condition.
Arendt tackles questions about common sense and its collapse from
different angles in Origins, The Human Condition, the moral philosophy
essays of the 1960s, and her final, incomplete book, The Life of the Mind.
In Origins, the loss of common sense is rooted in social disintegration and
isolation, resulting in cynicism and a reckless indifference toward factual
truth that made millions of people patsies for totalitarian propaganda. The
Human Condition ties the loss of common sense to excessive regard for
subjective experience at the expense of the world we inhabit in common, an
outlook she traces to Cartesian doubt and developments in the Scientific
Revolution. In “Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship” and “Some
Questions of Moral Philosophy,” she focuses specifically on the collapse of
moral common sense, epitomized by Germany’s frictionless slide from
moral decency into crackpot racism and its murderous consequences. And
in her final writings, she draws on Kant, who connected the cultivation of
judgment with the formation of a critical judging community of common
sense.
This paper examines Origins on the collapse of common sense, and
its connection with propaganda. It keeps contemporary events very much in
mind.
Before proceeding, I want to flag up front one of my conclusions in
the paper: that what looks like a collapse of moral common sense may not
be the mysterious inversion of values it seems. If a person has the outlandish
factual belief that innocuous people are actually mortal enemies who pose
a deadly threat, they may try to kill the imaginary enemies – not because
they now think murder is virtuous, but because killing in self-defense is not
murder. The apparent collapse of moral common sense can often be traced
to a collapse of factual common sense.
§2. Conspiracy Theories, Ideology, and Common Sense in The
Origins of Totalitarianism
Origins focuses on Nazi and Bolshevik totalitarianism and their
precursors, but many of Arendt’s observations have a resonance today that
verges on the uncanny – a crucial reason to examine them closely.
The first chapter of Origins bears the title “Antisemitism as an
Outrage Against Common Sense,” and it poses its questions
straightforwardly. How could the European Jews, a small, unarmed,
politically unrepresented, largely self-secluded minority people, come to be
feared and blamed for all the misfortunes in Christendom? How could the
peoples of supposedly “modern” Europe come to believe the most
incredible conspiracy theories about Jews? How could crackpot racial
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theories migrate from the fringe of society to the center of a mass murder
project of unprecedented scale? All of it defies common sense.
To Arendt, an equivalent outrage to common sense was the
“artificially fabricated insanity” of Stalin’s USSR, where “one mysterious
world conspiracy has followed another in Bolshevik propaganda, starting
with the plot of the Trotskyites, followed by the rule of the 300 families, to
the sinister imperialist (i.e. global) machinations of the British or American
Secret Services” – to which she later added the antisemitic Doctors’ Plot
that the Kremlin unspooled between editions of Origins.15 The Moscow
trials and executions of the Old Bolsheviks, based on their own confessions,
are a prime instance of outrages against common sense.
If, for instance, all the “confessions” of political opponents
in the Soviet Union are phrased in the same language and
admit the same motives, the consistency-hungry masses will
accept the fiction as supreme proof of their truthfulness,
whereas common sense tells us that it is precisely their
consistency which is out of this world and proves they are a
fabrication.16
Here we see one of several political and psychological explanations
Arendt offers for the loss of common sense: hunger for a consistent
explanation that makes sense of the “fortuitousness that pervades reality,”
especially injustices (real or perceived), personal calamities, and mass
misfortunes like economic crashes.17 Ideology supplies that need with what
psychologists today call a monological belief system – “a unitary, closedoff worldview in which beliefs come together in a mutually supportive
network.”18 Arendt uses the word “supersense.”19 Such hyper-logical
theories of everything are, automatically, more intellectually and

15
OT, 353 (artificially fabricated insanity), 351 (conspiracies), 351 n. 29, (conspiracy
accusations against “Jewish cosmopolitanism”), xxxviii (Doctor’s Plot).
16
OT, 352.
17
OT, 351–52.
18
Michael J. Wood, Karen M. Douglas, and Robbie M. Sutton, “Dead and Alive: Beliefs
in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories,” Social Psychological and Personality Science 3(6)
(2012): 767. The term comes from Ben Goertzel, Chaotic Logic: Language, Thought, and
Reality from the Perspective of Complex Systems Science (Plenum, 1994) and Ted
Goertzel, “Belief in Conspiracy Theories,” Political Psychology 15(4) (1994): 740. Both
Goertzels define a monological belief system as one that speaks only to itself, a description
very much in harmony with Arendt’s views about thinking and dialogue. Ben Goertzel
elaborates that such a belief system is relatively immune to testing because it offers the
identical master explanation for all events. In a dialogical belief system, by contrast, the
structure of explanations will differ among different events, and each explanation will be
relevant to the character of the event to be explained. PDF version of Chaotic Logic, 166.
19
OT, 457–58.
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emotionally satisfying than the “fortuitousness that pervades reality,” more
commonly known as “shit happens.”20
Even those who know better can be locked into the logical dungeon
of supersense. In Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, Rubashov (a
fictionalized Bukharin) confesses to unreal crimes because the logic of
Bolshevik ideology compels him to confess. That’s an explanation not so
far from Arendt’s. We now know that many victims of the Great Terror
confessed not because of “supersense” but because they were tortured; but
others who were not tortured do seem to have confessed for Rubashovian
reasons. As historian Yuri Slezkine explains the logic,
When it came to crimes against the Party, which stood for
the Eternal Law, thoughts were not radically different from
words, and words were not radically different from deeds.
And when it came to the Party’s Inquisition, sins were not
radically different from crimes.21
Hence the confessions from men whose sole sin was having at some point
doubted the wisdom of the Party line. Common sense tells us that is no
reason to confess to crimes one hasn’t committed. But common sense is
precisely what ideology displaced.
Conspiracy theories, like ideologies, partake of supersense – and, as
Arendt notes, they also resemble the mental constructions of paranoiacs,
where everything follows inexorably from a delusional first premise; she
adds that the insanity lies not only in the premise but also in the sheer
logicality by which every observable fact snaps crisply into place within the
theory.22 Reality is never that logical; it is untidy. Shit happens.
Some might protest that far from being hyper-logical, conspiracy
theorists are supremely illogical. Survey subjects who believe Princess
Diana is still alive are more likely than average to believe she was murdered.
Likewise, people who believe that Osama bin Laden was already dead at
the time of his killing are more likely to believe he is still alive.23 Cassam
(understandably) concludes that these people hold contradictory views.24
That’s not quite what the study shows, though. It finds that assent to the
inconsistent theories rises and falls together; but that can easily be because
subjects hold them in the alternative, not the conjunctive, and believe both
are better than the Official Story. There is nothing illogical in thinking that
20
See Pete Mandik, “Shit Happens,” Episteme: The Journal of Social Epistemology 4
(2007): 205–18; Cassam, Conspiracy Theories, 26, 60 (on the unwillingness of
conspiracists to accept that sometimes shit happens).
21
Yuri Slezkine, The House of Government: A Saga of the Russian Revolution (Princeton
University Press, 2017), 840–53; the quoted passage is at 844.
22
OT, 457–58.
23
Wood, Douglas & Sutton, “Dead and Alive.”
24
Cassam, Conspiracy Theories, 45; Cassam, Vices of the Mind: From the Intellectual to
the Political (Oxford UP, 2019), 70 n. 28.
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both of two inconsistent theories are more likely than a “known” falsehood.
Where supersense comes in is the network of runaway inferences “proving”
that the Official Story must be a lie.
Leaders were by no means immune to supersense. Stalin’s ideology
proclaimed that collectivized farms would be a socialist triumph. Instead,
grain production in the Ukraine fell between 1931 and 1932. Since the Party
line is infallible (premise), what could explain the failure? Stalin concluded
it was intentional sabotage by counterrevolutionary and nationalist
peasants.25 What else could it be? Sabotage calls for ruthless repression, not
realistic grain quotas. To meet impossible and punitive quotas, even
peasants’ seed corn was confiscated, guaranteeing lower outputs at next
planting. And that provided further proof of active sabotage.26
The result: millions starved to death in the Holodomor, Stalin’s
man-made famine in the Ukraine. Stalin never personally observed the mass
starvation, but local officials did. “Forced to interpret distended bellies as
political opposition, they produced the utterly tortured conclusion that the
saboteurs hated socialism so much that they intentionally let their families
die.”27 Utterly tortured, utterly contrary to common sense – and utterly
logical, given the axiom that the Party line can never be wrong.
§3. Moral Common Sense
A crucial point: Loss of common sense about factual reality leads to
loss of common sense in moral matters. If Ukrainian peasants are starving
their own families to death to sabotage socialism, perhaps they deserve to
die. If the Jews are a powerful alien race locked in a death struggle with the
German Volk, mass murder is self-defense.28 Mass murders are morally
heroic if SS men kill for racial reasons and not for personal gain or
gratification.29 If “my Trotskyite vacillations in 1923” led a Soviet official
to attend dinners where the Party line was questioned, “I am profoundly
guilty” of “counterrevolutionary wrecking activities” for failing to report
the dinners to the secret police.30
25

Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (Basic Books, 2010),
40–41, 44.
26
Ibid., 45.
27
Ibid., 41.
28
Michael Wildt, “Eichmann und der kategorische Imperativ, oder: Gibt es eine
nationalsozialistische Moral?” in Norbert Kampe and Peter Klein, eds., Die WannseeKonferenz am 20. Januar 1942: Dokumente, Forschungsstand, Kontroversen (Böhlau
Verlag, 2013), 157–61.
29
Ibid., 163–66. This comes from Heinrich Himmler’s bone-chilling speech to the SS in
Posen on October 4, 1943, discussed as well by Arendt, EJ 105–06.
30
Slezkine, 843–44. The quotes are from Aron Gaister’s confession. Gaister was a good
Party man; at the time of the Holodomor, he praised the success of collectivized agriculture
and celebrated “the liquidation of the contradiction between town and village.” Ibid., 309.
His confession was not extracted through torture, and he begged for a chance to expiate his
thought crimes, which he freely admitted were dire. He was shot in 1937.
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It follows that crime is not crime, famine is justice, doubts are
treason, racism is virtue, and the shining hallmark of the SS killer is his
decency (Anstand).31 Here we see artificially fabricated moral insanity, in
which common sense principles are twisted into moral hallucinations.
Importantly, these examples don’t require a total inversion of values, in
which evil is now declared to be good. Self-defense, just punishment,
patriotism, solidarity, and doing one’s painful duty all belong to common
sense morality. All they need to transform into moral insanity is the halftwist of applying them to factual claims that defy common sense. In
Bolshevism and Nazism, the other half-twist was supplied by one genuine
transvaluation of values: wholly subsuming the worth of individuals into
the worth of the collective (the Volk or the class) and defining the sole moral
imperative as victory over the collective’s enemies.
§4. Conspiracy Theories, Ideology, and Supersense
Arendt discusses conspiracy theories, ideology, and totalitarian
propaganda together. But it is important to recognize that conspiracy
theories and ideologies are by no means the same thing. An ideology is a
global worldview that purports to explain events as surface manifestations
of larger forces, explicable by a few fundamental principles – for the Nazis,
a biological struggle for existence among races, for the Bolsheviks,
inexorable historical laws of class conflict.32 The ideologies Arendt focused
on drew inspiration from the large-scale philosophies of history of the 19th
century, which conceptualized history not as a narrative of events, but as an
unfolding process, governed by hidden laws of motion that it is the job of
historians to uncover.33 Ideology of this sort connects the seeminglyrandom dots of histoire des événements into a lawlike pattern. In this
respect, it sounds like science, and it has the pretension of being science, or
at any rate of resting on science. The crucial difference is that where the
aims of science are explanatory, ideologies are politicized through and
through.
Conspiracy theories, by contrast, have little or nothing to do with
science. In place of impersonal, law-governed forces of history, they
substitute evil cabals executing secret plots. Conspiracy theories and
ideologies both try to make sense (or supersense) of events as surface
manifestations of hidden realities, and both are political; but there the
31

Wildt, 163–66. Again, this comes from Himmler’s 1943 Posen speech.
These, Arendt notes, are the two ideologies that “have come out on top and essentially
defeated all others.” OT, 159. She did not mention, and probably never studied, the laissezfaire Social Darwinism of the US and Britain at the turn of the 20th century, which persists
in some libertarian circles today. But this too qualifies as a dominant ideology.
33
Arendt, “The Concept of History,” in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in
Political Thought (New York: Viking, 1968). I analyze this essay in Luban, “Hannah
Arendt’s Theory of Theory,” Social Research 50(1) (1983): 215–48, revised and reprinted
under title “Hannah Arendt and the Primacy of Narrative,” in Luban, Legal Modernism.
The obvious progenitor was Hegel; see OR, 45–49.
32
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resemblance stops. Many of today’s conspiracy theorists are frankly antiscience, because scientists belong to the shadowy elites that conspiracy
theorists hate and fear.34 These conspiracists may appear to be credulous,
and in obvious ways they are. Yet, as Brian Keeley observes, they also have
an almost nihilistic level of skepticism about anything the authorities say,
including scientific authorities and experts.35
In that respect, today’s New Conspiracists are close cousins to flatEarthers, whose ranks are apparently swelling courtesy of the internet and
social media.36 Part of the challenge facing flat-Earthers is explaining why
their opinions are widely scorned; and the natural answer is that the
scientists must be in on the plot to hide the truth, in cahoots with the media
and – inevitably – the government. Imagine the vast scientific betrayals that
went into faking those space station photos of Round Earth, not to mention
the perfidious cartographers who flood the world with globes showing
Antarctica rather than the wall of ice that holds the oceans in! – What looks
at first glance like a harmless dotty view about an apolitical natural fact
turns out to be deeply political; in the words of a psychologist who studies
the flat-Earth subculture, they “view the world through this really dark filter
where [they] assume that all authorities and institutions and corporations
are just there to exploit you.”37
The sheer contingency of facts means that facts could have been
otherwise.38 That opens a logical space for conspiracy theories: they could
be true. Because the conspiracy theory could be true, the burden of proof is
on you to show it isn’t, or so the conspiracist insists. You can’t deny that
sinister and incredible government conspiracies actually have existed –
consider, for example, the CIA’s multi-year, multi-million-dollar secret
research into mind control, which included dosing unwitting subjects with

34

On the related point that the “new conspiracism” is conspiracy shorn of political theory,
see Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying: The New
Conspiracism and the Assault on Democracy (Princeton UP, 2019), ch. 1.
35
Brian L. Keeley, “Of Conspiracy Theories,” Journal of Philosophy 96(3) (1999): 125–
26.
36
Rob Picheta, “The flat-Earth conspiracy is spreading around the globe. Does it hide a
darker core?”, CNN, Nov. 18, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/16/us/flat-earthconference-conspiracy-theories-scli-intl/index.html. More than a quarter of Americans
believe the Sun goes around the Earth. National Science Board, Science and Engineering
Indicators 2018, https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/report/sections/scienceand-technology-public-attitudes-and-understanding/public-knowledge-about-s-t. I take the
label “New Conspiracism” from Muirhead and Rosenblum.
37
Rachel Brazil, “Fighting flat-Earth theory,” Physics World, July 14, 2020,
https://physicsworld.com/a/fighting-flat-earth-theory/, quoting psychologist Asheley
Landrum.
38
This is a point Arendt emphasizes in “Truth and Politics,” in Between Past and Future,
242: “facts have no conclusive reason whatever for being what they are; they could always
have been otherwise, and this annoying contingency is literally unlimited.”
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LSD.39 If it could happen then, the conspiracist reasons, why doubt that it
is happening now? Invariably, the conspiracist has boatloads of “evidence.”
Unless you’re willing to waste your life fact-checking the rubbish heap of
minutiae that conspiracists always have at their fingertips, the conspiracists
triumph, at least in their own minds.40
If conspiracy theories are anti-science, what is their connection with
“scientific” totalitarian ideologies? The answer is that conspiracy theories
can get along fine without a scientific ideology – as shown by the antiscience “new conspiracism” – but a scientific ideology, which (in Arendt’s
words) “pretends to have found the key to history or the solution to the
riddles of the universe,” needs conspiracy theories.41
First, as Stalin’s devastating diagnosis of the bad Ukrainian harvest
illustrates, conspiracy theories are necessary to explain away the inevitable
but embarrassing predictive failures of the ideology. Events would have
unfolded as the ideology predicted (so the supersense reasoning goes) if it
hadn’t been for sabotage – which, by the way, the ideology rightly
anticipated. Conspiracy theories provide convenient, easy-to-understand
auxiliary hypotheses patched on to a theory to make it fit errant data. As a
historian of Soviet Russia notes:
For at least a decade Bolshevik authorities had promoted the
idea that there were no accidents in the Soviet Union, no
39

The program, code-named MK-ULTRA, came to light during several congressional
investigations in the 1970s. See Stephen Kinzer, Poisoner in Chief: Sidney Gottlieb and
the CIA Search for Mind Control (New York: Henry Holt, 2019); Alfred McCoy, A
Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror (Holt,
2006). Congressional investigations: Report to the President by the Commission on CIA
Activities Within the United States (June 1975); Joint Hearings on Biomedical and
Behavioral Research before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare and the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure
of the Senate Judiciary Committee (1975); Project MKUltra, the CIA’s Program of
Research in Behavioral Modification: Joint Hearing Before the Select Comm. on
Intelligence and the Subcomm. on Health and Sci. Res. of the Comm. on Hum. Ress., 95th
Cong. 62 (1977); Human Drug Testing by the CIA, United States Senate Subcommittee on
Health and Scientific Research and the Committee on Human Resources, on S. 1893, to
Amend the Public Health Service Act to Establish the President's Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, and for Other
Purposes (1977), http://www.gulfwarvets.com/HumanDrug.pdf; Cold War Era Human
Subject Experimentation: Hearing Before the Legislation and National Security Subcomm.
of the H. Comm. on Government Operations, 103rd Cong., (1994) https://perma.cc/T6MBQGJ5.
40
Richard Hofstader’s famous essay on the “paranoid style” in American politics notices
the conspiracist’s “almost touching concern with factuality” as he “carefully and all but
obsessively accumulates ‘evidence’” in order to “prove that the unbelievable is the only
thing that can be believed.” Hofstader, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,”
Harper’s Magazine, Nov. 1964, https://harpers.org/archive/1964/11/the-paranoid-style-inamerican-politics/. There is a great deal of overlap between Hofstader’s essay and Arendt’s
observations.
41
OT, 457.

11
incompetence, no random crimes, no freak catastrophes.
Industrial accidents, production below plan, theft, murder,
and rape were “not coincidental.” They all had political
meanings; they were all perpetrated by saboteurs, class
enemies, and foreign intelligence services.42
Conspiracy theories make great auxiliary hypotheses to save the ideology.
For, as Keeley points out, to a conspiracist evidence against the theory is
really evidence for it: it shows how desperate the conspirators are to bury
the truth. Hitler wrote that proof that the Protocols of the Elders of Zion are
a forgery is actually “the surest proof that they are genuine.”43
Second, and obviously, conspiracies justify crackdowns and
repression, which totalitarian or strongman regimes ruthlessly exploit. An
instructive illustration is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s purge of supposed
“Gulenist” conspirators in the wake of the 2016 Turkish coup attempt. The
coup attempt was real, but it provided Erdoğan a welcome excuse for a
purge of wider scope, sweeping away independent judges, liberal
academics, and other regime critics whom Erdoğan had yearned for years
to get rid of. Needless to say, many have no connection whatever with
Gulen.
Third, to be translated from esoteric theory to user-friendly mass
propaganda, ideologies need to be repackaged, dumbed down, and
dramatized. In Arendt’s words:
Bolshevism and Nazism began even to eliminate those
sources of their own ideologies which had already won some
recognition in academic or other official quarters. Not
Marx’s dialectical materialism, but the conspiracy of 300
families; not the pompous scientificality of Gobineau and
Chamberlain, but the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion”; not
the traceable influence of the Catholic Church and the role
played by anti-clericalism in Latin countries, but the
backstairs literature about the Jesuits and the Freemasons
became the inspiration for the rewriters of history. The
object … was always to reveal official history as a joke, to
demonstrate a sphere of secret influences of which the
visible, traceable, and known historical reality was only the
outward façade erected explicitly to fool the people.44
There is no contradiction between “low” conspiracy theory and “high”
ideology, because conspiracy theories can run comfortably in parallel with
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the more abstract, academic, and “respectable” ideologies to form a unified
propaganda package that appeals to elites and masses alike.
Ludwig Bieberbach, a University of Berlin math professor and
ardent Nazi, could publish a “scientific” book about the influence of blood
and race on mathematical styles. (After trying and failing to find decent
excuses for Bieberbach’s theories, a renowned British mathematician
commented that he found himself “driven to the more uncharitable
conclusion that he really believes them true.”45) Dr. Mengele’s mentor
Otmar von Verschuer ran a well-funded anthropology, genetics, and race
science institute; he lectured to London’s Royal Society on twin research
(Mengele’s specialty at Auschwitz) as late as three months before the war.46
Meanwhile, street-level racists with no interest in genetics or the difference
between “J-type” and “S-type” mathematics could settle for the Protocols
of the Elders of Zion.
§5. Arendt’s political sociology in Origins
What explains contempt for the rules of common sense? Origins
offers several explanations, historical, psychological, and philosophical.
My interest is mostly philosophical, but a quick overview of Arendt’s
historical and psychological diagnoses will provide useful context.
We have already seen one such diagnosis: Arendt roots the loss of
common sense in the human need for meaningful explanations, however
farfetched, of manmade disasters and injustices that befall us. Trying to
make sense of economic crashes and the incomprehensibly pointless
carnage of the First World War drove many Europeans to supersense at the
expense of common sense. But that raises a question: why now? After all,
misfortune and injustice are always with us, and so is the human need to
make sense of calamities.
Arendt’s answer, in brief, is that nineteenth century capitalism’s
production of “superfluous wealth and superfluous men” shredded the
traditional European class system and created a mass society of atomized
individuals, who no longer understood their place in the world, and were
therefore ripe for recruitment into mass movements peddling meaning in
the form of supersense.47 Politically, parliamentary democracy – with its
give and take of opinions rooted in real interests – depended on a system in
45
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which parties represented classes; with the “wreckage of classes”48 the party
system collapsed and the mass movement prevailed.
Let’s take a deeper look. Arendt’s detailed analysis employs a
political sociology of her own device, a quirky taxonomy of European
society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries built around six
categories: the mob, the people, the masses, the bourgeoisie, the philistines,
and the elites.
The mob and the people
The mob corresponds roughly with Marx’s lumpenproletariat, an
underclass of the angry, disaffected, thwarted, cynical, and violent – with
one significant difference. For Arendt, the mob is drawn from all classes,
because she includes in it the inciters and abettors of mob violence, not just
the perpetrators. She introduces the term in her discussion of France’s
Dreyfus affair, where tangible, physical mobs were egged on by the military
and antisemitic intellectuals. Quoting blood-curdling antisemitic rhetoric
from the supposedly respectable classes, she remarks, “While the mob
actually stormed Jewish shops and assailed Jews in the streets, the language
of high society made real, passionate violence look like harmless child’s
play.” She adds: “The upper classes knew that the mob was flesh of their
flesh and blood of their blood.”49
For Arendt, the mob need not be a literal mob, and the AntiDreyfusard mob is only an instance of “the human debris that every crisis,
following invariably upon each period of industrial growth, eliminated
permanently from producing society”;50 it is “the refuse of all classes”51
from whose ranks, among other things, were drawn the adventurers and
soldiers of fortune in Europe’s African imperialism, along with the
underworld. Today, we might well include in the mob actual physical mobs
and armed groups, but also armies of internet trolls with their distinctive
brand of nihilism and self-loathing, channeled into universal otherloathing.52
Because the mob (in her expanded sense) is drawn from all classes,
it can easily be mistaken for the people, “which also comprises all strata of
society. While the people in all great revolutions fight for true
representation, the mob always will shout for the ‘strong man,’ the ‘great
leader.’ For the mob hates society from which it is excluded.”53 Arendt’s
scattered comments on the mob resonate strongly with contemporary
48
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analyses of populism, where strong-man leaders appeal to the mob by
assuring them that they alone are the true people, and any political
opponents are enemies of the people.54
Masses and philistines
The masses are different from the mob, although Arendt cautions
that once totalitarian movements acquired mass followings it was easy to
overlook the difference, because the mentality of their leaders so closely
resembled that of nineteenth-century mob leaders.55 Arendt defines
“masses” as follows:
The term masses applies only where we deal with people
who either because of sheer numbers, or indifference, or a
combination of both, cannot be integrated into any
organization based on common interest, into political parties
or municipal governments or professional organizations or
trade unions. Potentially, they exist in every country and
form the majority of those large numbers of neutral,
politically indifferent people who never join a party and
hardly ever go to the polls.56
Her key conclusion is that totalitarian movements arise “wherever there are
masses who for one reason or another have acquired the appetite for
political organization.”57 The psychology of the masses includes “a typical
feeling of superfluousness – … the concomitant of mass unemployment and
the population growth of the last 150 years,” manifesting itself
psychologically, or one might even say spiritually, in “self-centered
bitterness.”58
Included among the masses are what she calls the philistines – “the
bourgeois isolated from his own class, the atomized individual who is
produced by the breakdown of the bourgeois class itself.”59 Here she
evidently means the downwardly-mobile middle classes in times of
economic and social crisis.
The mass man whom Himmler organized for the greatest
mass crimes in history bore the features of the philistine
rather than the mob man, and was the bourgeois who in the
midst of the ruins of his world worried about nothing so
much as his private security, was ready to sacrifice
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everything – belief, honor, dignity – on the slightest
provocation.60
The bourgeoisie
Elsewhere in Origins where she speaks of the bourgeoisie, Arendt
means capitalists, that is, owners of capital, not the middle classes. Arendt
accepts Marx’s insight that what makes capitalism distinctive is not
acquisitiveness but endless expansion of capital, “the bourgeoisie’s empty
desire to have money beget money,” in which “wealth became a neverending process of getting wealthier.”61 To this she adds Rosa Luxemburg’s
insight that this process will require endless expansion and therefore
imperialism – which, in Arendt’s analysis, contradicts the nation-state
principle and presaged the 20th century collapse of the system of European
nation-states.62
Most conspicuously, she draws her picture of the (big) bourgeoisie
from a reading of Hobbes – “the true … philosopher of the bourgeoisie” and
“the only great thinker who ever attempted to derive public good from
private interest.”63 Hobbes reduces reason to “Reckoning,” and human
worth to whatever price the market fetches for one’s labor power.
Accordingly, the bourgeois state is grounded in self-interest, not law or
right. And “[p]ower, according to Hobbes, is the accumulated control that
permits the individual to fix prices and regulate supply and demand in such
a way that they contribute to his own advantage. … Therefore, … desire for
power must be the fundamental passion of man.”64 Hobbes is “the great
idolator of Success.”65
I leave to one side the accuracy of Arendt’s quirky Hobbes
interpretation. For our purposes, what matters is not whether Arendt got
Hobbes right (I doubt it), but what she thinks she gets from Hobbes, namely
a picture of the bourgeois as a success-worshipping moral hypocrite. Her
political critique is that the bourgeois willingness to sacrifice freedom for
prosperity and security rests on the fallacy that public good can come from
aggregating private interests.66
But hers is also a moral critique, and as Arendt explores the political
psychology that gave rise to totalitarian movements, the moral critique takes
on a central role. For, at the same time the bourgeoisie wrests power from
60
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the aristocracy, it embraces the fiction of its own invincible rectitude,
namely the fiction that its moral rules aim solely to protect the innocent
pursuit of private interest. Bourgeois morality is a hypocritical overlay of
pieties masking something far uglier and more ruthless.
The elites
The unmasking of bourgeois hypocrisy came from the elites. One of
Arendt’s themes is the alliance between elites and the mob, evinced early
on in “high society’s constantly growing admiration for the underworld,
which runs like a red thread through the nineteenth century, its continuous
step-by-step retreat on all questions of morality, and its growing taste for
the anarchical cynicism of its offspring.”67 Elite cynicism intensified after
the cataclysm of World War I. The war’s trauma filled the Lost Generation
(Arendt calls it the “front generation”) with a bitter, brittle nihilism. Today,
we might diagnose the syndrome as moral injury, a cousin to PTSD.68 As a
contemporary psychiatrist observed, the mantras his Vietnam veteran
patients used to shrug off their pain and loss – “Don’t mean nothing” and
“Fuck it!” – eventually “spread out to engulf everything valued or wanted,
every person, loyalty, and commitment.”69
The disillusioned, morally injured front generation included not
only the demobilized soldiers, but also civilian contemporaries who shared
their bitterness and “were completely absorbed by the desire to see the ruin
of this whole world of fake security, fake culture, and fake life.”70 They
were filled with “justified disgust” for the pieties of bourgeois morality.
Among literary elites this disgust manifested itself in “their brilliant and
witty praise of violence, power, and cruelty.”71 The mob wanted “access to
history even at the price of destruction” – and the elites who egged them on
“did not object at all to paying a price, the destruction of civilization for the
fun of seeing how those who had been excluded unjustly in the past forced
their way into it.”72 They did it for the lulz.
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The upshot
What should we make of Arendt’s taxonomy? It is not grounded in
demographic data, surveys, or psychology experiments; rather it is a
narrative cultural study.73 An obvious first question is whether her
underlying history is reliable. The breadth of her research is remarkable. We
should nevertheless expect errors of fact at the granular level – after all,
Arendt had no access to Soviet archives, she did not read Russian, her
material resources were meager, and there has been a mountain of research
in the seven decades since Origins. (To cite just one example: based on
news reports of Khrushchev’s secret 1956 speech, Arendt accepted the
popular theory that Stalin arranged the Kirov murder that he used as an
excuse for the Great Purge. Subsequent historians, with access to Soviet
archives, have mostly discredited it.74) For present purposes, there is no
need to sort out this kind of thing, and in any case sorting it out isn’t
anything I am equipped to undertake.
As for the overarching narrative – the macro- rather than microhistory – subsequent decades have generated major disputes between
competing interpretations of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia. Some are
roughly consistent with Arendt, others decidedly not.75 There are likewise
differing accounts of the class composition of the Nazi base. Again, some
of these views are consistent with Arendt, others less so.76 A bigger problem
73
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is that her picture of Nazi Germany and the Stalinist USSR is a composite,
and some elements are true of one but not the other. Arendt is not careful to
sort these out. But, as with the granular micro-history, for our purposes there
is no need to enter the fray of competing historical interpretations of the
macro-history. Whether or not Arendt was right about how Germany got to
the point that millions of people lost their moral and factual common sense,
the point is that they lost it.
Obviously, Arendt’s categories are anything but a neutral
descriptive sociology. Mob and philistines are words of contempt, just as
the people is a theory-laden republican praise-word. Bourgeoisie can be
used as a neutral class category, but Arendt leaves no doubt that she
associates Europe’s 19th and early 20th century bourgeoisie with moral rot.
Masses, defined as people with no interest in public life, comes closest to a
purely descriptive term; but Arendt gives it a largely negative inflection and
warns that mass society is ripe for totalitarian recruitment. As for the elites,
her disgust at their casual nihilism could hardly be plainer. Hers is a morally
loaded, normative sociology, not a social science description. And Origins
is as much a moral argument as a historical and political analysis.
Her sociology is specific to a unique epoch and place, as Arendt
herself emphasizes. Readers will have no difficulty finding contemporary
analogues to Arendt’s categories. For example, Arendt attributes the “revolt
of the masses against … common sense” to “their loss of social status along
with which they lost the whole sector of communal relationships in whose
framework common sense makes sense.”77 An entire literature about
populism and polarization in the contemporary United States offers variants
of the same diagnosis. But there are no one-to-one correspondences
between then and now, and we should beware of superficial analogies,
which come almost too easily. For present purposes, the leading question
is not how Arendt’s typology applies today, but rather what any of this has
to do with the loss of common sense.
A great deal, as it turns out. The punchline of Arendt’s story of class
wreckage, atomization of masses, and backlash against hypocrisy is a
corrosive attitude toward factual truth that she was among the first to
pinpoint. In addition to the epigraphs to this paper, consider a few other
observations:
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Mass propaganda discovered that its audience was ready at
all times to believe the worst, no matter how absurd, and did
not particularly object to being deceived because it held
every statement to be a lie anyhow.
A mixture of gullibility and cynicism is prevalent in all ranks
of totalitarian movements, and the higher the rank the more
cynicism weighs down gullibility. The essential conviction
shared by all ranks, from fellow-traveler to leader, is that
politics is a game of cheating.78
The difference between truth and falsehood may cease to be
objective and become a mere matter of power and
cleverness, of pressure and infinite repetition.79
The true goal of totalitarian propaganda is not persuasion but
organization.80
And this from “Truth and Politics,” an essay written in 1967:
[F]actual truth is no more self-evident than opinion, and this
may be among the reasons that opinion-holders find it
relatively easy to discredit factual truth as just another
opinion.81
In this environment, propagandists happily exploit the conviction that all
opinions are created equal. Arendt’s observations seem as recognizable, and
as devastatingly valid, today as when Arendt wrote them seventy years ago.
I was not surprised when a U.S. Marine general, an expert on information
warfare, told me that he urges his colleagues and students to study the
chapter on propaganda from The Origins of Totalitarianism.
§6. The epistemology of bullshit
Let’s focus on two of her observations – that mass propaganda’s
audience “was ready at all times to believe the worst, no matter how absurd,
and did not particularly object to being deceived because it held every
statement to be a lie anyhow,” and that their mental state is therefore a
“mixture of gullibility and cynicism.” That mental state sounds like a
contradiction in terms. Gullibility normally means excessive willingness to
believe, while cynicism means something close to the opposite.
The solution to the contradiction it is to reframe gullibility as the
willingness to accept anything, without necessarily taking it to be true,
either because it comes from a favored partisan source, or because one has
cynically devalued truth (or both). A perceptive journalist described the
attitude of Donald Trump’s followers to his torrent of lies as falling
78
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“somewhere between true belief and being in on the joke.”82 That sounds a
lot like gullibility (true belief) and cynicism (being in on the joke). A
clickbait entrepreneur who makes his living purveying fake news offers a
related diagnosis: Trump “just said whatever he wanted, and people
believed everything, and when the things he said turned out not to be true,
people didn’t care because they’d already accepted it.”83
Muirhead and Rosenblum describe the gullibility side of this attitude
as being willing to settle for “true enough” rather than “true” (“well, it may
not be true, but it’s true enough”), adding that the corresponding
propositional attitude is neither belief nor disbelief.84 Conspiracists are
willing to settle for “true enough,” because whose views you accept and
whose you reject has become a matter of tribal identity rather than factual
belief. Here one thinks of Arendt’s observation (quoted above) that the goal
of propaganda is not persuasion but organization. Persuasion aims at
changing someone’s belief; organization aims at recruiting them to a tribe,
so that belief and truth no longer matter. Or rather, the only truth that matters
is truth about tribal identity. What matters isn’t factual reality, but the reality
of “us,” the real people, in contrast to the poisonous subtlety of “them,” the
tribal adversary in the body politic.
Epistemic malevolence
Contemporary philosophers have become increasingly interested in
epistemic vices – mental attitudes that conduce to falsehood, just as mental
attitudes and traits like attentiveness and honesty conduce to truth. One such
vice is epistemic malevolence, an oppositional attitude toward the truth,
manifesting itself in active efforts to defeat truth and frustrate truthseekers.85 This may seem like just a fancy label for lying, but it is a broader
category. Epistemic malevolence also includes information suppression
(erasing or stealing public records; bribing, intimidating, or murdering
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witnesses; no-snitch honor codes like omertá and police forces’ “blue wall
of silence”).
In addition, it includes what I will call epistemic decoy flooding, the
release and circulation of so much fake news, sometimes commingled with
truth, that it is nearly impossible to sort out truth and falsehood in real time.
The analogy is to military tactics such as releasing decoy balloons with the
same radar characteristics as missiles to confuse missile detection systems,
or surrounding warships with a flotilla of civilian craft. Besides
camouflaging the truth, Regina Rini shows that an especially deadly aim of
epistemic decoy flooding is to make the truth seem to be merely one of
several spin-doctored narratives. As Rini argues, it actually helps malign
actors if some of their fake news is transparently false. “The point is not to
implant false beliefs. Rather, the point is to induce skepticism. By flooding
the channels of public discourse with falsehood, then allowing citizens to
know that this has happened, anti-democrats make it reasonable for us to
trust no one, least of all our co-citizens.”86 Arendt anticipated Rini’s
observation when she wrote that “factual truth is no more self-evident than
opinion, and this may be among the reasons that opinion-holders find it
relatively easy to discredit factual truth as just another opinion.”87
Of course, suppression and concealment need not count as
malevolence in a moral sense – that depends on whether keeping something
secret is morally justified or not. Not everyone is entitled to know
everything that everyone else knows. In a courtroom setting, suppression
includes lawful tactics such as invoking the attorney-client privilege or
fighting discovery. While legal suppression tactics can be abused, they also
serve legitimate purposes. In such cases epistemic malevolence need not
imply moral malevolence – but information suppression is, by definition,
epistemically malevolent nonetheless.
An instructive example of epistemic and moral malevolence, using
otherwise legitimate suppression tactics, is the tobacco industry’s decadeslong effort to keep the public ignorant or at least doubtful about the harmful
effects of smoking.88 The effort was meticulously orchestrated. To reassure
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the public, the industry created a “research institute” that commissioned
scientific studies of tobacco’s health effects – but it released only studies
that aided its disinformation campaign (blowing smoke, one might say), and
suppressed the rest. Scientific reports were routed through industry lawyers
rather than sent directly to management, so that lawyers could assert the
attorney-client privilege to shield them from discovery in lawsuits against
Big Tobacco. The scheme came to light only in the late 1990s, after forty
years of successful stonewalling. The result was an adverse legal ruling
piercing the attorney-client privilege because of Big Tobacco’s fraudulent
intent, leading to the release of millions of pages of damning documents,
and forcing a multi-billion dollar settlement. The prolonged industry effort,
which combined lying, half-truths, decoy flooding, and suppression using a
legitimate legal device, is a perfect illustration of epistemic malevolence at
work, but also moral malevolence.
Lying, suppression, decoy flooding. One of Arendt’s keenest
observations is that the result is not deceit but rather “a peculiar kind of
cynicism — an absolute refusal to believe in the truth of anything, no matter
how well this truth may be established.”89 As she put it in an interview, “if
everyone always lies to you, the consequence is not that you believe the lies,
but that no one believes anything at all anymore.”90 Kant was perhaps the
first to argue that a generalized practice of lying undermines the credibility
of all statements.91 Arendt takes the argument a step further, and tells us
what it would be like to live in that world.
It’s essential to distinguish between the producers, distributors, and
consumers of disinformation, and also to ask the separate question of
whether producers and distributors actually believe what they are saying.
Epistemic malevolence – the desire to defeat truth and frustrate truthseekers – is a vice of producers and distributors of propaganda, not
consumers. It may seem obvious that producers of fake facts don’t believe
their own fabrications, but that is not always the whole story. Of course
whoever wrote the Protocols of the Elders of Zion knew it was fake, but
they may well have believed in the reality of a world Jewish conspiracy.
This was Josef Goebbels’s view. He believed the Protocols were fake; they
nevertheless represented “the inner, but not the factual truth.”92 To take a
more recent example, Jürgen Elsässer, the editor of a far-right German
magazine that vigorously promotes QAnon, “does not believe in a
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conspiracy of pedophile elites, preferring to look at it as ‘allegories.’”93 But
he may believe in whatever liberal elite wickedness these phantasms are
allegories for. Ideologists presumably believe their own ideology, and may
regard their factual fabrications as “true enough.”
And we must not discount the possibility that producers are taken in
by their own productions. As I noted earlier, conspiracists often come
equipped with buckets of “evidence” – small, innocent or not-so-innocent
facts that to a suitably attuned mind add up to proof. Their basic inference
pattern is that if what they suspect could happen, their smatterings of
evidence “prove” that it did happen. (If voting machines could be hacked
they were hacked.)
The logician A. N. Prior coined the label “runabout inference ticket”
to describe a bogus rule of reasoning that can get you from anywhere to
anywhere else – and “my conspiracy theory could explain my scraps of
evidence, therefore it does explain it” is a perfect runabout inference
ticket.94 Let’s look at an example I mentioned earlier: the theory (au courant
when I wrote these words) that Bill Gates somehow planned to insert mindcontrol microchips in millions of people through covid vaccinations. Here
is the evidence:
• Gates gave pre-covid speeches about the need for population
control to reduce climate threats. Gates noted that improving health in
developing countries is a promising strategy, because better health has been
shown to correlate with lowered birth rates. Among the health measures
Gates favors are vaccination and women’s access to birth control. The
ineluctable conclusion, as one conspiracy video warns: “Bill Gates
Vaccines are used for depopulation.”95
• In 2017 Gates gave a speech in Davos warning against nations’
unpreparedness for “an epidemic, either naturally caused or intentionally
caused.” This video drew dire comments, especially post-covid: “He has
not warned; he has planned.” “He dropped the ‘intentionally’ several times
PAY ATTENTION. He is giving us hints.” “Really easy to predict the
future when you write the script.” “Why the hell would you even say
intentional if you didn’t know anything? That implies evilness or maybe he
chooses not to admit. Pure evil.” “He’s working on injections with a
microchip to monitor population.”96
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• Then came a February 2020 announcement by the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation that it would commit $100 million “for the global
response to the novel coronavirus,” including vaccine research.97
• Next: a scientific paper on a novel technology to trace who has or
has not received vaccinations, by using quantum dots delivered to skin via
“microneedle patches” – research supported by none other than the Gates
Foundation.98
• The icing on the conspiracy cake was a 2018 patent application by
Microsoft researchers for a method to link body activity data to
blockchain.99
There you have it. Population control via vaccination and
contraception. Gates hinting at intentional epidemics – at Davos, no less,
known by all to be Ground Zero for international elite conspiracies. Covid
vaccine research and a “global” response. Microneedles. Vaccine tracing.
Gates Foundation. Microsoft. Blockchain monitoring body activity. It’s all
there, once you stitch the pieces together on a backcloth of antivaxxing,
climate denialism, and political resentment. One result: almost 700
thousand people petitioned the White House to investigate the Gates
Foundation for medical malpractice and crimes against humanity.100
The key point is that whoever launched the conspiracy theory may
actually believe it, or sort of believe it, because their epistemic stance equips
them with a runabout inference ticket that converts suspicions to certainties,
catalyzed by these tantalizing smidgens of “evidence.” In just the same way,
Stalin and Kaganovich may actually have believed that reactionary peasants
were sabotaging the Ukrainian harvest. Peasant hostility to collectivized
farming was a known fact, the bad harvest was a known fact, and the
infallibility of the Party line provided the inference ticket.
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What we see, therefore, is something surprising: that epistemically
malevolent actors can have varying degrees of belief in their own
fabrications, ranging from clear-eyed knowledge that the fabrications are
lies, to belief that they are “true enough” or allegorically true, to belief
(based on runabout inference tickets) that they are true full stop. But,
regardless of the purveyors’ degree of credence, their fabrications directly
aim to defeat factual truth, and that makes their propaganda epistemically
malevolent.
Epistemic insouciance and culpable credulousness
Closely related to epistemic malevolence – and crucial to
understanding Arendt’s insights – is a different vice, what Cassam calls
epistemic insouciance:
an indifference or lack of concern with respect to whether
their claims are grounded in reality or the evidence.
Epistemic insouciance means not really caring much about
any of this …. Epistemic insouciance is a particular form of
not giving a shit.101
His prime examples are Brexit campaigners including Boris Johnson, who
in his pre-political career as an EU-baiting journalist was fired twice for
lying and “laughed it off when it was shown that his stories bore no relation
to reality.”102
Harry Frankfurt defines bullshit as speech in which the speaker
doesn’t care if it is true or false.103 Epistemic insouciance is the vice
associated with bullshitting. Whereas epistemic malevolence is willful
deceptiveness, the bullshitter’s mental state is what criminal lawyers call
recklessness: conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. In
mass propaganda, it is a double risk: the risk of deceiving others, and, as
Arendt rightly warns, the risk of devaluing truth itself and inducing a kind
of all-consuming cynicism that devours common sense.
Epistemic insouciance comes in many flavors. Its motivation can be
political, as with the Brexit campaigners. Some among them might truly
believe the Brexit ideology; others may not, and simply sought power.
Among the epistemically insouciant we also find apolitical grifters who
make money off of clicks, and who understand that in the market for
clickbait, bullshit sells. Some bullshit purveyors may not recognize the
cynicism their decoy flooding produces in their audience; others may
recognize it and regard it as regrettable collateral damage in pursuit of
political victory. And some may actively seek to sow this kind of cynicism,
either for political gain or for nihilistic amusement.
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This is supply-side insouciance – that is, the epistemic insouciance
of propagandists. But there can also be epistemic insouciance on the
demand side, that is, on the part of propaganda’s targets. Of course, these
are the duped, not the dupers. That doesn’t make consumers innocent
victims, however, if they are willfully or recklessly gullible rather than
innocent and naive. Their stance toward the propaganda is receptive, not
guarded – in Arendt’s words, they are “ready at all times to believe the
worst, no matter how absurd.”104
Arendt’s insight is that they could choose a more epistemically
vigilant stance, but willfully or recklessly prefer not to. Then, when the
propaganda they’ve accepted turns out to be false, they insulate themselves
from responsibility for accepting it, either by grudgingly thinking “it’s true
enough” or – as Arendt argues – by cynically rationalizing that it’s all lies
and cheating out there anyway. Instead of feeling betrayed by the liar, they
like him because he knows how to play the cheating game, and now they
are in on the joke.
Whether their response to propaganda is “it’s true enough” or “it’s
all cheating anyway,” the result is a radical devaluation of facts and
common sense. Here, the maxim of common sense that epistemic
insouciance jettisons is “Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame
on me.” In its place, the motto seems to be “fool me once, good for you;
fool me twice, fine with me. It’s all cheating anyway, and I like your bullshit
better than the other side’s bullshit.”
“It’s all cheating anyway” cynically devalues truth, and in that way
becomes a handy excuse for what I will call culpable credulousness. Mere
gullibility needn’t be culpable. It can be a sign of an innocent and trusting
nature, a character trait that is more touching than vicious. Culpable
credulousness is different. It intentionally devalues factual truth as an
excuse for letting oneself be fooled – as long as it’s “our side” that is doing
the fooling.
Recast in these terms, the epistemic stance Arendt calls “a mixture
of gullibility and cynicism” would more properly be called a mixture of
culpable credulousness and cynicism. The cynicism is at once the product
and the source of the credulousness: it is the product, because credulous
individuals allow themselves to be fooled again and again, which would be
enough to make anybody cynical. It is the source, because the cynical
premise that every statement in the public sphere is a lie excuses the
consumer who keeps coming back for more. Devaluing truth as an excuse
for one’s own credulousness is precisely what makes credulousness
culpable.
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This circular and self-reinforcing process gives meaning to the
second epigraph to this paper: “Totalitarian propaganda can outrageously
insult common sense only where common sense has lost its validity.”105
Common sense has lost its validity when a large segment of the populace
has become so bitter and disaffected that it no longer values holding factual
truths in common with others.
§7. Rules of common sense
The virtue corresponding to the vice of epistemic insouciance is
epistemic vigilance (a phrase I borrow from Dan Sperber and his coauthors106). Given that by far the greater part of what we know comes from
other people, vigilance against being misinformed or misled by them is an
indispensable trait. It requires us to evaluate testimony from others along
the two dimensions of competence and honesty – asking the questions is my
informant in a position to know that? And is my informant trying to fool
me? Experiments show that children already make such discriminations by
age four, and likely even earlier.107 This suggests that just as the
indispensable propensity to trust other people as sources of knowledge is
hard-wired into our cognitive heritage, so is the counterbalancing trait of
vigilance. An essential part of vigilance consists of following rules of
common sense when someone tells us something that matters to us.
Arendt would certainly agree that there are rules of common sense.
Recall that Arendt speaks of “general contempt for even the most obvious
rules of common sense,” and the first page of Origins warns that “never
have we depended so much on political forces that cannot be trusted to
follow the rules of common sense.”
Rules of common sense are not inexorable laws of logic; they are
rules of thumb. Perhaps the most famous rule of common sense is Occam’s
Razor, understood here as the principle that baroque or arcane explanations
should be rejected in favor of simple ones if the simple ones cover the
facts.108 But there are others. We have already seen a few examples. One
such rule is that if it’s too good to be true, it isn’t true:
If, for instance, all the “confessions” of political opponents
in the Soviet Union are phrased in the same language and
admit the same motives, … common sense tells us that it is
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precisely their consistency which is out of this world and
proves they are a fabrication.109
And if a supposed conspiracy would require flawless coordination and
perfect secrecy by hundreds of otherwise unconnected people, common
sense tells us that it didn’t happen.
Common sense also looks at the competence and honesty of sources.
If informants claim to know something they are in no position to know, a
rule of common sense instructs us to discount what they say. And if an
informant has repeatedly lied in the past and been exposed, don’t believe
that informant the next time. (Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice,
shame on me.) Holding self-serving assertions to a higher standard of proof
than adverse admissions is another rule of common sense. – Obviously, this
list could easily be expanded. The question is, if epistemic vigilance is hardwired into us, as it seems to be, how can rules of common sense get disabled
on a mass scale?
As we’ve seen, Arendt blames it on a kind of willful cynicism and
insouciance brought on by the collapse of traditional society – a political
explanation with moral overlay. But there are more innocent non-political
explanations as well. An inherent problem is that the everyday mechanisms
of vigilance we learn from childhood are geared to face-to-face interactions,
and they don’t scale up to entire populations. Sperber and his co-authors
identify at least four points of mismatch, none of which have to do with
atomization in mass society:
1. The longer the chain of transmission, the more likely that the facts
being transmitted are garbled; and we usually have no idea how long the
chain is when a friend passes along something interesting that the friend
learned from someone else. We are likely to judge that information as
though our trusted friend is the source, rather than recognize it as the final
link in a long telephone game.
2. Furthermore, ordinary vigilance about sources doesn’t work when
the source is unidentifiable, and the intelligence is passed along merely
because “a lot of people are saying ….”
3. The normal human pleasure of spreading interesting news, which
is benign and even indispensable in everyday life, means that fake news will
often come to us from multiple seemingly-independent sources that confirm
each other, even though it originated with a single producer.
4. And the conformist pressure to believe what a large group
believes – or at least, to accept what they accept – is surely just as strong as
conformist pressure to behave as the group behaves.110
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All this would be true regardless of Arendtian “gullibility and
cynicism.” All the same, Sperber and his co-authors concur that “empty
creeds” can invade whole populations when accepting them defines group
identities. They argue that in such cases the acceptance is not strictly
speaking epistemic, but what they mean is that acceptance is not the same
as belief – which is exactly Arendt’s point when she writes that the true goal
of propaganda is not persuasion but organization. For that reason, I think
Sperber and his co-authors misstate their point when they say that tribalist
belief-acceptance is not epistemic. The practice of accepting propositions
for purely tribalist reasons defeats truth and knowledge, and that is very
much an epistemic vice. And when empty creeds invade whole populations
common sense has, as Arendt puts it, lost its validity.
§8. The collapse of moral common sense
To conclude, I want to return to the loss of moral common sense.
Earlier I argued that losing moral common sense does not require a radical
transvaluation of values where good is evil and evil is good – although we’ll
see shortly that Arendt occasionally and mistakenly spoke this way as a
figure of speech. To be sure, Nazi fanatics boasted about “a completely new
spirit of Germanic coldness,” but that kind of blather is not required for the
loss of moral common sense.111
All that is required is false factual beliefs about existential threats to
things you hold dear. If you believe that entire races or classes are your
deadly enemies, or that the very existence of your society is menaced by
secret conspiracies, then killing the enemies will seem like justified selfdefense. And even people who aren’t convinced about existential threats
may acquiesce if the falsehood comes to be the prevailing opinion,
promoted by leaders and hyped by their propaganda machine; they will do
so on the shoulder-shrugging theory that if there’s so much smoke perhaps
there really is fire. In short, the collapse of factual common sense can topple
moral common sense by conjuring up fictitious enemies and triggering selfdefense. This requires no transvaluation of values, only a supersense
interpretation of facts, coupled with the common belief that deadly threats
can justify actions in self-defense that would ordinarily be forbidden.
One of Arendt’s keenest insights is that in such a toxic epistemic
environment rules of thumb we use to identify wrongdoing fail, and in
failing will bring about the collapse of morality. In Eichmann in Jerusalem
and elsewhere, Arendt discusses several examples of commonsense rules of
epistemic vigilance that failed in totalitarian regimes.
The first, and most fundamental, such rule is to look around at what
conduct respectable and decent people treat as normal. Aristotle rightly
observes that young people learn to be virtuous by imitating the virtuous,
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not by reasoning their way to virtue; and although we eventually graduate
from imitation to making our own judgments, he holds that we actually have
no better measure of right and wrong than looking to “the good person
insofar as he is good.”112 If respectable people go about their business in the
normal way, we may assume that things are not as bad as they seem. This
observation is connected with the bystander effect familiar from social
psychology: if the other bystanders to a disturbing event seem unperturbed,
then we are less likely to be perturbed. And the bystander effect may be
reciprocal, until a saturation point is reached and the abnormal becomes
normal.
In any case, it is all too easy to equate the conventional views of the
majority with common sense. As a slightly comical example, a theologian
once commented that “the average layperson today has too much common
sense” to doubt the authenticity of Christian miracles.113 Now by definition,
a miracle is an event that defies common sense; that is what makes it a
miracle. But we understand exactly what the theologian meant: Christian
scholars who deny the historical accuracy of the Gospel are fringe, and the
multitudes who believe in miracles are the mainstream. Mainstream belief
is common sense.
But conventions can be fickle and quickly swayed by propaganda.
If the reigning ideology is evil, someone trying to calibrate their own moral
compass by checking it against the weathervane of mainstream opinion is
lost. This is central to Arendt’s diagnosis of Eichmann: “His conscience was
indeed set at rest when he saw the zeal and eagerness with which ‘good
society’ everywhere reacted as he did. … [H]is conscience spoke with a
‘respectable voice,’ with the voice of respectable society around him.”114
And it was not Eichmann alone. Even Dr. Josef Mengele, the “angel of
death” conducting infamous human experiments at Auschwitz, was not the
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sadistic monster of legend; he was doing respectable normal science in the
academic community of Third Reich genetics and anthropology.115
In addition to looking up and looking around at other people, we ask
“Is this an exception to a moral rule, or is it prescribed by the rule itself?”
The exceptional status of an act is a second alarm bell warning us that the
act is presumptively wrong. It signals deviance, and deviance is a name we
give to wrongdoing. But this mechanism fails when the prevailing morés
have made exceptions into rules. “I am alluding, of course, to what
happened in Nazi Germany and, to some extent, also in Stalinist Russia,
when suddenly the basic commandments of Western morality were
reversed: in one case, ‘Thou shalt not kill’; in the other, ‘Thou shalt not bear
false witness against thy neighbor.’”116 In the SS, “Thou shalt kill” became
the rule, and “Thou shalt not kill” was the deviation.
As I remarked above, these striking formulations sound like Arendt
is describing a transvaluation of values, but I don’t think that is what she is
getting at. If it is, it’s a mistake. A better way to understand the phenomenon
is to recognize that most rules of conduct have exceptions for emergencies.
For example, most would agree that “Thou shalt not kill” has an in-built
exception for killing in self-defense against deadly threats. By redefining
the factual situation as one of existential struggle against enemies, the
totalitarian regimes shifted the boundary of who counts as a mortal threat,
and in that way they swapped the persecution of innocents out of the
categories of sin and crime and into the category of legitimate self-defense.
Although Arendt frames this as the reversal of rule and exception, it’s more
accurate to describe it as redrawing the boundary of the rules to expand the
category of exceptions.
This is an important point. Arendt marvels bitterly at how quickly
and frictionlessly Germany adopted a criminal morality – adding that it
should not reassure us about morality that after the war it was equally easy
to turn morality upright again.117 My suggestion here is that morality never
did turn upside down; rather, what turned upside down was a factual
assessment of whether the world was now in a state of exception. Factuality,
not morality, turned upside down.
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Either way, however, her shrewd point remains that detecting evil
by its deviance no longer becomes a reliable rule of moral common sense.
Legitimate exceptions don’t count as deviance.
A third hallmark we use to recognize evil is temptation. A person is
tempted to stray sexually – forbidden fruit! Or to break an inconvenient
promise (forbidden fruit!), or to lie your way out of trouble (forbidden
fruit!). But the converse is also true: the very fact that an ordinary human
being is not in the slightest bit tempted to murder innocent people takes
away this tell-tale sign by which someone, ordered to kill by his superiors,
recognizes evil.
Evil in the Third Reich had lost the quality by which most
people recognize it – the quality of temptation. Many
Germans and many Nazis, probably an overwhelming
majority of them, must have been tempted not to murder, not
to rob, not to let their neighbors go off to their doom …. But,
God knows, they had learned how to resist temptation.118
A fourth mechanism is even subtler. The mass murders and
enslavements committed by the Third Reich were hedged around with
bureaucratic restrictions on who, when, where, and how. Participants could
see that “by no means all was permitted” even in the Holocaust.119 That
made it appear that there was nothing nihilistically cruel about mass murder
on a vast scale. It lacked the “anything goes” earmark of casting moral
restraint to the winds.120 A good example is the strange, revealing story of
SS judge Konrad Morgen, analyzed in the illuminating moral biography by
Herlinde Pauer-Studer and David Velleman.121 Morgen was a strict rule-oflaw prosecutor in the SS’s internal justice system. He zealously prosecuted
unauthorized looting, killing, and corruption by SS men in death camps –
but failed to notice how anomalous that was in a setting where he was
surrounded by murder and looting on an industrial scale.
In sum, Arendt calls our attention to four rules of moral common
sense to recognize wrongdoing (although she doesn’t use that terminology,
and doesn’t discuss all of them in one place):
1. It’s wrong if most respectable people around me say it’s wrong
and behave as if it’s wrong.
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2. It’s wrong if it deviates from a generally accepted social rule.
3. It’s wrong if I feel a temptation toward it, coupled with (or
recognized by) the lurking sense that I shouldn’t give in because
the fruit is forbidden.
4. It’s wrong if it is part of an antinomian practice, that is, a practice
in which it seems as though all restraint has been cast off and all
is permitted.
In criminal regimes, none of these rules works as advertised. Those
relying on them would be unable to distinguish authentic morality from the
twisted conventional morality of the regimes. We can generalize from the
case of criminal regimes: any powerful social institution that manages to set
up a twisted system of conventional morality based on “facts” that defy
common sense will make it hard for those within it to tell right from wrong.
Mechanically applying the everyday rules of moral common sense to
fictitious facts speeds us on our way to Hell.

